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Texas Gulf Sulphur: Its Holdings and Implications
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past few years the developments in the field of federal
securities law have come at an ever-increasing rate,' but seldom has
any development been met with such a reaction by the financial press
as that which followed the decision of the Second Circuit Court of2
Appeals in its recent opinion in S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
The uneasiness of the investment community began with the filing of
the complaint in 19653 and reached a peak in the days following the
reversal of the trial court by the Second Circuit.4 The filing of a
complaint against Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith only a few
days later contributed to this reaction
These recent developments have come in an era of almost
unprecedented investment by small speculators trying to realize quick
profits in the stock market. The interest in the investment market has
reached a level where new issues, which may be almost worthless,
must be apportioned to the investors6 and may often double and triple
in value in only a few days.7 Under these conditions, the need for
investor protection becomes clearly apparent.
The effect of the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision on the business
world was immediately evident. Corporate executives announced new
policies against discussing developments with anyone, including
brokers and investment analysts, and some corporations were advised
not to name brokers to their boards of directors. 8 Perhaps the most
widespread reaction in the investment community has been confused
I. See, e.g.. Kennedy & Wander, Texas Gull Sulphur. A Most Unusual Case. 20 Bus.
LAW. 1057 (1965); Lowenfels, The Demise oj the Birnbaunt Doctrine: A New Era Jor Rule lOb-

5,54 'A. L. REv. 268 (1968); Posner, Developments in Securities Regulation, 20 Bus. LAW. 595
(1965).
2. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
3. See Shapo, Rule lOb-5 and Texas Gull Sulphur: An Evolution oj Questions and
Answers, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939 (1965-66).
4. See. e.g., NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26, 1968, at 66: Green, SEC Sees Court Rulings on
'Insider' Trading Changing Brokers" Method oj Operations.Wall Street Journal, Sept. 3, 1968,
at 24, col. I; Green, SEC' Considers Telling "nsiders" How Long To Wait Bejore Trading On
Conipant News, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 30, 1968, at col. 3; Wall Street Journal, Aug. 21,
1968, at 8, col. I; Wall Street Journal, Aug. 16, 1968, at I, col. 6.
5. SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-1680, [Current] CCH Fl-D. Siic. L. REP.
T 77,596 (August 26, 1968).
6. Berton, A Piece oj the Action, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 7, 1968, at .1, col. 6.
7. Id.
8. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 16, 1968, at I, col. 6.
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anxiety.' The purpose of this note is to analyze the holding in the
Texas Gulf Sulphur case as it relates to prior law and to consider
some of the problems raised by the decision. Some suggestions will
also be made for possible resolution of the most disturbing questions
raised by the decision.

II.

THE FACTUAL SETTING

In order to understand the holding in the case and some of the
implications which seem to follow, it is essential to have some
comprehension of the facts involved. As early as 1957, Texas Gulf
Sulphur (hereinafter TGS) had begun a search for mineral deposits by
aerial exploration of the Canadian Shield. Surface examinations of
strong anomalies, or variations in conductivity, were made, and if
further exploration seemed to be warranted, core drilling was
commenced and the findings evaluated. Prior to November, 1963,
TGS had drilled some 65 of these anomalies, but most had revealed
only barren pyrite, graphite, or "marginal mineral deposits in
insufficient quantities to be commercially mined."'" On November 8,
1963, drilling was commenced on the most promising quarter section
then controlled by TGS near Timmins, Ontario. The group in charge
of the drilling consisted of: defendant Mollison, a mining engineer and
vice-president, of TGS; defendant Holyk, the company's chief
geologist; defendant Clayton, an electrical engineer and geophysicist;
and defendant Dorke, a geologist. The drilling of the initial hole, K-551, was completed on November 12, and visual estimates of the
mineral content of over 599 feet of the core indicated an average zinc
content of 8.64 per cent and an average copper content of 1.15 per cent.
Relying on this visual estimate by Holyk, defendant Stephens, the president of TGS, decided that the company should acquire the remainder of
the Kidd 55 segment. In order to facilitate the acquisition, Stephens
instructed the exploration group not to disclose the results even to
other directors, officers and employees of TGS. The core sample was
flown to the United States for chemical analysis, and usual security
measures in the mining industry were put into effect." During a
period beginning on November 12 and continuing up until April 8,
defendants Fogarty, the executive vice-president and a director,
9.
10.

NEWSWEEK,

Aug. 26, 1968, at 66.

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
11.Cut saplings were stuck into the drill hole and a barren core was drilled off of the
anomaly.
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Clayton, Holyk, and Mollison purchased shares of TGS stock in the
market at prices ranging from 17 3/4 to 18 1/8 dollars a share.
The results of the chemical assay were received by TGS in midDecember and revealed an average mineral content for over 602 feet
of the core of 1.18 per cent copper and 8.26 per cent zinc, as well as 3.94
ounces of silver per ton of ore. "These were the only chemical assay reports on any drill hole which TGS received prior to April 16, 1964.' ' 2 In
December, January, February and March, defendant Dorke and those
to whom he had made recommendations to buy TGS made calls and
purchases of TGS stock. The other defendants also continued to buy
stock during this period at prices from 20 3/8 to 25 dollars a share.
On February 20, 1964, the TGS Stock Option Committee met and
extended options to defendants Stephens, Fogarty, Kline, vicepresident and general counsel, Mollison and Holyk, all of whom
accepted the options without revealing their knowledge of the K-55-1
drilling to the members of the Committee. On February 26 and
March 3, defendant Huntington, an attorney who knew only about
the land acquisition prograi around the Kidd segment, purchased
stock and calls. Prior to the period from November 12, 1963 to
March 31, 1964, the defendants had owned 1,135 shares of TGS and
no calls; thereafter they owned 8,235 shares and possessed 12,300
calls."
On March 31, 1964, the land acquisition program having reached
a satisfactory point, drilling was resumed with the commencement of
K-55-3, located west of K-55-1 and drilled at an angle so as to form a
vertical plane with K-55-1; daily reports were sent to Stephens and
Fogarty by Mollison and Holyk. Visual estimates of K-55-3 indicated
percentages of copper and zinc similar to K-55-1 over 641 feet of the
876 foot length. On April 7, the same day that K-55-3 was completed,
K-55-4 was commenced, and by 7:00 P.M. on April 9, K-55-4 had
produced mineralization over 366 feet of its core. K-55-6 was
12. SEC v. Texas GulFSulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
13. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 844 (1968). During this same period
or time, however, there were other developments which could have influenced the decision to buy
TGS stock: the development of a phosphate project and potash mine (November 15, 1963); the
prediction by security analysts that there would be a turnabout in the price or sulphur stocks; the
acquisition ofCanadian oil properties (December 16, 1963); the new high level of free world sulphur
use and output (December 30, 1963); the launching of the world's largest liquid sulphur tanker by
TGS (December 30, 1963); the entry into service of a large liquid sulphur tanker for domestic
shipment (January 18, 1964); the sulphur expansion program in Canada (Fe.bruary 20, 1964);
new four-year high in sales for 1963 (February 20, 1964); and $2 per ton price increase for
sulphur (April I, 1964).
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commenced on April 8 with a second drilling rig, and on April 10, a
third rig commenced drilling K-55-5. There were no geologists at the
site on April 8 and 9, but it was apparent by April 10 that all holes
had encountered substantial mineralization. 4 Certain of the
defendants and their "tippees" continued to buy shares and calls up
to April 8 at prices from 25 7/8 to 28 1/8 dollars a share.
Because of rumors which had begun to circulate in Canada and
unauthorized reports implying a rich strike which appeared
in the New York Herald Tribune and the New York Tines on
Saturday, April 11, Stephens became concerned and telephoned
Fogarty at his home. Fogarty then contacted Mollison for a current
report on the drilling progress. 5 The following day, Fogarty, along
with Carroll, a public relations consultant, drafted a press release to
quell the rumors. After being channeled through Stephens and
Huntington, the release was issued at 3:00 P.M. on Sunday, April 12,
and appeared in the Monday morning newspapers.'6 "The evidence as
to the effect of this release on the investing public was equivocal and
less than abundant.' ' 7 The release purported to give the results of
drilling operations as of April 12, although Fogarty was only in
possession of the results as of 7:00 P.M. on April 10; a definite
statement was promised as soon as more conclusive results were
available. This release was the first attempt by either the company or
any of the individual defendants to make any public disclosure of the
drilling operation.
Drilling with the three rigs had continued over the weekend, and
a fourth rig had been put into operation on April 12. "Between April
12 and April 15 five additional holes had been drilled . . . and by
April 15 at 7:00 P.M. 5198 feet of core had been drilled compared
with 2776 feet on April 10.' '1 8 The additional holes which were
completed between April 12 and April 15 also established
mineralization in several planes. On April 13, TGS began to take
steps toward ultimate disclosure of the discovery. A reporter for the
14. The trial court found that a substantial body of commercially mineable ore existed at
7:00 P.M. on April 9, and that knowledge of the results to that time constituted material
information. 258 F. Supp. at 282.
15. Mollison was apprised of the results only to 7:00 P.M. on April 10.
16. The release stated that drilling operations were in progress but that the unauthorized
reports exaggerated the scale of operations. It indicated that drilling near Timmins. though
inconclusve and insufficient to reach definite conclusions, indicated that more drilling was
warranted. A definite statement was promised as soon as sufficient data was available.
17. SEC v. Texas GulfSulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833. 846 (1968).
18. Id. at 880.
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Northern Miner, a Canadian mining journal with a small circulation
in the United States, visited the site and prepared an article
confirming a ten million ton ore strike. Mollison examined the article
and returned in on April 15 for publication in the April 16 issue. A
statement was also given to the Canadian Minister of Mines for
release to the Canadian media at 11:00 P.M. on April 15, but for
some reason the release was not made until 9:40 A.M. on the 16th.
An official detailed statement announcing a "find" of some twentyfive million tons was read to the American press on April 16 from
10:00 A.M. until 10:10 or 10:15 A.M. The item appeared on Merrill,
Lynch's private wire at 10:29 A.M. and on the Dow Jones ticker at
10:54 A.M.
The only defendants who engaged in market activity between the
April 12 release and the April 16 release were Clayton, an engineer,
Crawford, Secretary of TGS, and Coates, a director. Clayton bought
200 shares on April 15; Crawford had entered orders for 300 shares at
midnight on the 15th and for another 300-at 8:30 A.M. on the 16th,
which were executed at the opening of the market on the 16th; Coates
left the press conference early on the 16th and ordered 2,000 shares at
10:20. Coates' broker, who was also his son-in-law, bought another
1,500 shares for himself and his customers. TGS climbed to a high of
37 on April 16 and closed at 58 1/4 on May 15. Subsequently the
Kidd mine has proven to be one of the richest finds in modern times,
and its economic value is further enhanced by the low cost of
extraction due to the proximity of the ore to the surface.
III.

THE LEGAL SETTING AND THE HOLDING OF THE COURT

A.

Background of Rule lOb-5

At the time the 73d Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933"
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,20 the United States was
emerging from the greatest financial trauma in its history. President
Roosevelt was determined to see that the wild speculation and
deceptive practices which contributed to the 1929 stock market crash
would not be allowed to recur. In his message to Congress calling for
the passage of the 1933 Act, President Roosevelt advocated a securities
act based on a policy of complete disclosure, rather than an act-similar
to many present Blue Sky Laws-embodying a protective policy
19.
20.

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964).
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whereby the government would interpose its financial judgment for

2
that of the investor. 1

This same policy found expression in the reporting requirements
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, but to these provisions
were added proscriptions against manipulative devices. A House of

Representatives Committee, reporting on the bill which became the
1934 Act, announced the general purpose of the Act to be the

regulation of "the relationships of the investing public to corporations

which invite public investment, '2 and in the preamble the Act itself
expressed its purpose to be "to prevent inequitable and unfair practices

and to insure fairness in securities transactions generally . . 3
Unfortunately, the legislative history underlying section 10(b) is
almost nonexistent. The House Committee commented on the
provision which became section 10: "False and misleading statements
designed to induce investors to buy when they should sell and to sell
when they should buy are also outlawed and penalized." 2' The Senate
Committee reported only that section 10(b) was intended to empower

the Commission to prohibit or regulate "manipulative or deceptive
practices which it finds detrimental to the interests of the investor. '2
Pursuant to the authority granted to it, the SEC adopted Rule

lOb-5 on May 21, 1942.2 The new rule purported to close a
"loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the
Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying

securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase.2' 7 In a recent
decision the Commission stated: "These anti-fraud provisions [1Ob-5]
are not intended as a specification of particular acts of practices
which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the
21. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7 (1933).
22. Id. at 2.
23. 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
15,051.
24. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cohg., 2d Sess. 10 (1934).
25. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934). For a more complete discussion of
the legislative history, see Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision oJ
LegislativeIntent?. 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 642-58 (1963).
26. Rule 10b:5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968) provides: "it shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
27. SEC Securities Exch. Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) (emphasis added).
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infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of
investors and others." 8
With this scant background and with no provision for civil
liability, the courts and the SEC have made Rule lOb-5 a powerful
weapon against fraudulent practices in securities transactions and
have used it as the foundation on which to build an emerging body of
federal corporate law.29
B.

Liability of "Insiders"

1. Definition of "Insiders.'--Although both the statute and the
rule make it unlawful for "any person" to engage in the proscribed
practices, the provision has been applied most frequently to corporate
"insiders." 3 0 The courts and the SEC recognized the inequities of
allowing those closely connected with a corporation to buy and sell
stock in their company on the basis of information which was
unavailable to the public. A major problem, however, in protecting
against improper actions by insiders is that there is no precise
delineation of those to be included in this category. Section 16(a) of
the 1934 Act, which was directed against "short-swing" profits by
insiders, extends its coverage to "[e]very person who is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any
class of any equity security . . . or who is a director or an
officer.""1 In addition to the classes of investors covered by
section 16(a), Professor Loss suggests that the coverage should be
extended to members of those persons' immediate families, their
"tippees" who knew or should reasonably have inferred that the tip
was a "breach of trust," a person who picks up information in the
course of business negotiations with a corporation as long as that
information remains private, and brokers who trade for insiders and
who have knowledge of inside information 2 Despite the suggestion
that "tippees" should also be liable, this premise had found little or no
support in the case law prior to the district court opinion in Texas
Gulf Sulphur.
28.
29.

30.

Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
See text accompanying notes 67-71 infra.
See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1445-74 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as

Loss].
31. 15U.S.C.§ 78p(a) (1964).
32. Loss, supra note 30, at 1451-52. See also Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate
Injormation Practices: The Implications oJ the Texas GulJ Sulphur Proceeding. 51 IVA.L. REV.
1271 (1965).
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Chairman Cary of the SEC stated the Commission's views on
insiders in the 1961 decision against Cady, Roberts & Co. Mr. Cary

there said that the definition of an "insider" rests on two principal
elements:
the existence of a relationship giving access to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he
is dealing. . . [O]ur task here is to identify those persons who are in a special
relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer
correlative duties in trading in its securities. Intimacy demands restraint lest the
uninformed be exploited.P

Although it had been suggested previously that the definition should
include any employee who had knowledge of undisclosed corporate

information, 34 the opinion of the district court in the Texas Gulf
Sulphur case was the first court to so hold.
In upholding the district court's statement of the law on who is

an insider, the Second Circuit stated that Rule lOb-5 applies to one
possessing the requisite information even if he does not come within

the specific terms of Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act. Accordingly,
the court affirmed the liability of employees who were apprised of the
drilling results when they traded TGS stock. The court also affirmed

the SEC's determination in Cady, Roberts and held that "anyone in
possession of material inside information" must either disclose such

information or abstain from trading in or recommending the
securities of the company.

Although the question of the liability of

"tippees" was not squarely presented, since the SEC chose to proceed
against the insiders who gave the tips and not against the "tippees"

themselves, the court in dictum said that if "tippees" "acted with actual
or constructive knowledge that the material information was
undisclosed, their conduct. . . could be equally reprehensible." 36
2. Type of Conduct Prohibited.- Since the first decision which
33. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
34. Fleischer, supra note 32.
35. 401 F.2d at 848.
36. Id. at 853. In Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968), a "tippet"
was held to be in pari delicto with the source of his tip and thereby precluded from recovering
from him in a lOb-5 suit. Although 'civil liability under lob-5 exists only by judicial implication,
the public interest might be better served by cutting off illicit tips at their source, and one
method of realizing this objective would be the disallowance of the in pari delicto defense in a
suit by a tippee. It does seem unconscionable, however, to allow a tippee who voluntarily took
advantage of a breach of trust by an insider to recover his loss from the source of his
information. But cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134
(1968).
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implied a civil remedy under Rule lOb-5,3 7 the courts have struggled

with the question of which elements a plaintiff should be required to
prove in such an action. This problem became even more difficult
when the implied private remedy under Rule lOb-5 was extended to
buyers of securities, in spite of the express congressional provisions for
buyers' remedies under section 11 and section 12 of the 1933 Act. In
Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co., the Second Circuit held
that "when, to conduct actionable under § I1 of the 1933 Act, there is

added the ingredient of fraud, then that conduct becomes actionable
under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and the Rule .... -3"Because of the
language used in the Rule, most early decisions required some proof

of the elements of common law fraud-either proof of some form of
scienter, knowledge on the part of the defendant, or some "semblance

of privity"-in order to find liability, 9 but there has been a growing
trend toward liability where there is no proof of scienter or intent'
Although some writers still contend that proof of scienter should be
necessary for relief under Rule lOb-5, 4' they urge a more modern
definition of the terms which would vary according to the

circumstances surrounding each defendant's activities and which would
include negligent conduct when, as in the case of an insider, there is a

duty to disclose4 The requirements for a private action are relaxed
somewhat in an enforcement proceeding, so that less proof is required

in an action by the Commission for injunctive relief than in a private
action .13
The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur held that whether the
37. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), subsequent
opinions, 73 F. Supp. 798 (1947) (accounting granted); 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947) (additional
conclusions of law).
38. 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951).
39. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.) (privity), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964);
Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), ajj'd,
198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (scienter); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946) (both privity and scienter present). For a more complete discussion on the
demise of privity, see text accompanying notes 75-95 in]ra.
40. SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966) (§ 17 of 1933 Act); Stevens v. Vowell,
343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Hendricks v. Flato Realty Invs., [Current] CCH
92,290 (D.C. Tex. 1968); Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y.
FED. SEC. L. REP.
1964). See generally Comment, Negligent Misrepresentation Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. CH. L.
REv. 824 (1965).
41. Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule lOb-5,
63 MICH. L. REv. 1070 (1965).
42. Id. at 1080.
43. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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proceeding were treated as an SEC enforcement proceeding or as a
private action," "proof of a specific intent to defraud is
unnecessary, ' '45 since the broader interpretation would better
effectuate the remedial purpose of the Act. The court also said that
the traditional requirement of scienter might be defined as lack of
diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct.
Therefore, the court concluded that the only defense available to the
insider who sells or purchases securities while in possession of
undisclosed material information is the reasonable belief that the
information had been disclosed when his trade took place. The court
found that none of the defendants could carry this burden, since
neither Crawford nor Clayton could reasonably have believed that the
information had been disseminated when they traded and all others
had clearly traded before any attempt at disclosure was made.
C.

The Definition of "Materiality"

One element that has consistently been required for liability of
insiders under Rule 10b-5 is that the information which they possess
be "material." 4 The only definition of this term which is given in the
official rules and regulations of the securities laws is found in Rule
405 of Regulation C under the Securities Act of 1933. This Rule
defines "material" as "those matters as to which an average prudent
investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the
security . . . . "I In Rule lOb-5 cases, the courts have applied a
variety of tests in determining whether a fact was material.
Information has been found to be material when it "would materially
affect the judgment of the other party to the transaction,"48 when "in
reasonable and objective contemplation [it] might affect the value of
the corporation's stock ' 41 and when it would affect the investor's
44. The complaint, brought by the SEC pursuant to §21(e) of the Exchange Act, sought
both an injunction against TGS and the individual defendants and rescission of the transactions
which were allegedly in violation of the law.
45. 401 F.2d at 854.
46. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 227 F.
Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), afJJd, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), reaJJ'd on later motions,
100 F. Supp. 461 (1951), 103 F. Supp. 47 (1952).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(l) (1968).
48. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
49. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965); Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
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decision on whether to sell or buy." The Restatement of Torts
definition of materiality, whether "a reasonable man would attach
importance [to the fact not disclosed] in determinining his choice of
action in the transaction in question,"'" has been adopted by several
courts.12 In all of these tests the information must be essentially
extraordinary in nature. Another test which has been suggested is that
information is material if it clearly places the insider in a position
superior to that of the average investor and protects him from normal
market risks 3 In the Cady, Roberts decision, the SEC applied the
test of whether the information would affect the outsider's investment
judgment, but also looked to the actions of the insider in trading
immediately upon receipt of the information as evidence of its
materiality 5
Recognizing that an insider is not obligated to disclose educated
guesses based on his superior financial or other expert analysis, the
Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur. held that an insider must
disclose only material "basic facts," leaving outsiders to use their
own powers of evaluation. The test of materiality applied by the court
was " 'whether a reasonable man would attach importance . . . in
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.'-5
However, the court held that a "reasonable man" includes not only
the conservative investor but also the speculator and the chartist, so
that information which might affect the desire of investors to buy,
sell, or hold the securities would include facts which affect the
probable future of the company as well as those facts concerning
earnings and distributions. The court stated that the materiality of a
fact depends upon a balancing of the "indicated probability that the
event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of
the totality of the company activity." 5 The court also accepted the
contentions of the SEC and held that the importance attached to a
fact by those who knew about it constitutes "highly pertinent evidence
1157
and the only truly objective evidence of the materiality ....
50. Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).See also 3 Loss, supra note 30, at 1461.
51. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1938).
52. See. e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
53. Fleischer, supra note 32, at 1290.
54. 40 S.E.C. at 911-12.
55. 401 F.2d at 849, quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
56. 401 F.2d at 849.
57. Id. at 851.
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Applying these standards, the court held that the trial court had erred
in finding that the drilling results were not material until 7:00 P.M.
on April 9 and found that knowledge of the "visual" results of K-551 constituted material information so that all transactions made by
those apprised of such results were made in violation of Rule lOb-5.
The court found that defendant Dorke, who was in possession of such
facts and who tipped others, also violated the Rule. In addition, the
court concluded that Huntington, who knew only about the land
acquisition program, had a "readily inferable and probably reliable"
understanding of the Kidd operations and therefore possessed material
information so as to make his purchases in violation of the Rule."5
D.

When Insiders May Trade

Prior to the lower court opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the
problem of how long insiders must wait after disclosure before trading
had not been considered by a court. If insiders are required to abstain
from trading until disclosure is made by the company, the question
must be answered as to when insiders may trade after a public
announcement has been made. In the trial of the Texas Gulf Sulphur
case, the Commission contended that insiders must wait until the
information is "absorbed" by the public.5 9 Former Chairman Cary
reiterated this view in a symposium held on November 22, 1965,1" and
Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Cary's former executive assistant, suggested that
insiders should wait for an arbitrary period of 24 hours."'
The district court opinion in the instant case held that insiders could
trade as soon as the information was made public and found that
defendant Coates did not violate Rule lOb-5 by leaving the press
conference on April 16 and trading at 10:20 A.M., since the
announcement had been made at that time.62 This holding has been
criticized as allowing insiders too much freedom to take advantage of
their early knowledge of developments, and it has been suggested that
insiders should wait until the news appears on the "broad tape." 3
58.

Judge Moore, dissenting, felt that the majority had incorrectly substituted their

findings of fact for those of the trial court and had ignored both the testimony of the experts

and the company's other developments. Quoting the Commission's own standards in regard to
"proven ore," he concluded that there was not enough evidence to support the majority's
finding that knowledge of the results of the first hole was material information and therefore
that the district court's findings should be affirmed. Id. at 870-89.
59. 258 F. Supp. at 267, 289.
60. Cary, Symposiumn- insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1015 (1966).
61. Fleischer, supra note 32, at 1291.
62. 258 F. Supp. at 289.
63. 80 HARV. L. REv. 468 (1966).
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Although the circuit court failed to set any definite standards for
the timing of insider trading after disclosure, it held that before
insiders may act, the information must have been "effectively
disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its availability to the

investing public."64 The court emphasized that where a formal
announcement has been promised in a prior official release, insider
activity must await dissemination of the promised official release. The
court held that at the minimum, even where the contents of the release
could be instantaneously acted upon, an insider must wait until the
news could reasonably be expected to have appeared over the Dow
Jones broad tape, the media of widest circulation. The court also

indicated that when the news is of a sort which could not be readily
translatable by investors, insiders cannot "take advantage of their
advance opportunity to evaluate the information by acting

immediately upon dissemination." 6 Accordingly the court found that

Coates had acted before dissemination and reversed the district court
finding that he had not violated Rule lOb-5. 6
E.

Purchase of Stock Options

One of the most recent trends in the cases brought under Rule
lOb-5 has been the development of a federal corporate law whereby
stockholders can sue derivatively to enforce the fiduciary duties owed
by officers and directors to their corporation. 7 There was some initial

objection to sustaining such suits when the plaintiff stockholders had
neither bought nor sold securities, 8 but this objection has been
ignored by subsequent decisions. 5 Fleischer has suggested that Rule
64. 401 F.2d at 854.
65. Id. n.18.
66. The district court also found that defendant Lamont, who had traded at 10:41 A.M.
after the press release, had not violated the Rule. Since Lamont died while the case was pending
appeal, the action was dropped as to him, and the Second Circuit did not have the opportunity
of deciding whether or not his trade was also too.soon after the announcement.
67. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961); see, e.g.. deHaas v.
Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968). See generally Fleischer, "'Federal
Corporate Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965). Contra. Ruder, Pitfials in the
Development of a Federal Law of Corporations Through Rule lOb-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185
(1964).
68. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
69. Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968) (merger); Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (tender offer); Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1967) (tender offer); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375
F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967). See
generally Lowenfels, supra note I.
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lOb-5 should cover the situation where an insider causes an uninformed
majority of the board of directors to issue options to him without disclosing the information known to him. 70 In Ruckle v. Roto American
Corp.,' the Second Circuit held that even a majority of the directors
can defraud the corporation where they approved the issuance of shares
of stock to a third party without disclosing material information which
would have made such issuance unwise. The district court held in the
Texas Gulf Sulphur case that Stephens and Fogarty (the president and
executive vice-president of the company) were top management officers
and therefore would have violated Rule lOb-5 by failing to disclose the
the options issued
information which they possessed before accepting
72
material
been
had
information
such
if
to them
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's position that a
member of top management, before accepting a stock option, must
disclose material inside information to the Stock Option Committee.
Since the appellate court had determined that the information
possessed by the defendants was material at the time that the options
were accepted, it found that they had violated the Rule and remanded
for a determination of whether injunctions should issue against
Stephens and Fogarty! 3 The court also found that Kline, as secretary
of the company, was a member of top management and directed
rescission of his option.74
F.

The Corporate Press Release and the "in Connection With
Clause

Both section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 require that the proscribed
conduct be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
Early decisions under the Rule interpreted this requirement to be
equivalent to some form of common law contractual privity," but this
requirement has been substantially eroded by later decisions. In
70. Fleischer, supra note 32, at 1301-03.
71. 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Weitzer v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
72. 258 F. Supp. at 292.
73. These defendants had already surrendered their options.
74. In a discussion at 401 F.2d at 857 n.24, the court recognized that when corporate
purposes are best served by not requiring insiders to make information known to the Option
Committee, it might be better to require merely that the insiders abstain from exercising the

options rather than from accepting them. Since the suggestion was not presented, the court
made no determination on the issue.
75. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Ward La France
Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
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Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio and Television Corp., the plaintiffs had
bought securities some thirteen days after the defendants had sold,
and recovery was denied because "[a] semblance of privity between
the vendor and purchaser of the security in connection with the
improper act, practice or course of business was involved seems to be
requisite and it is entirely lacking here. ' 7 Some relaxation of the
requirement of privity was found in Fischman v. Raytheon
Manujacturing ('o._7 where the plaintiffs were held to have stated a
cause of action when they allegedly purchased preferred stock in the
defendant corporation in reliance on misleading statements in a
registration statement for common shares. Although the Farnsworth
case was affirmed the next year by the same court, Judge Frank's
dissent hastened the demise of the privity doctrine by calling for a
replacement of that requirment by proof of the plaintiff's reliance on
the misrepresentation and proof of foreseeability on the part of the
defendant that the class of people including the plaintiff might be
injured.7 8 Although some courts still require a "semblance of
privity, ' 79 the trend is toward a complete abandonment of the
concept"0 because of the desire to eliminate the technical restrictions of
the common law and to interpret the securities act as broadly as
possible in order to "effectuate [their] remedial purposes."'8
Consequently, most courts do not now limit a Rule l0b-5 action to a
suit against the other party to the transaction, but allow recovery
against a third person "if in connection with the purchase or sale [by
the plaintiff] that person defrauded [the plaintiff]. ' 2 - Some courts
have even eliminated the requirement that the plaintiff be a purchaser
or seller.83
As a result of the gradual liberalization in interpreting the "in
76.
77.
78.

99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), ajj'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J. dissenting). See also Ruder, supra note 25, at

673-74.
79. Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 218 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
80. Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Freed v. Szabo
Food Serv., Inc., [1961-1964 Transferf Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
91,317 (N.D. Ill.
1964); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); see Note, Civil Liability
Under Section lOB and Rule 1OB-5: A Suggestion Jbr Replacing the Doctrine oJ Privity. 74
YALE L.J. 658 (1965).
81. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
82. New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See also
Rustic V. Werblin, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. , 91,637 (S.D.N.Y.

1966).
83.
1967).

See cases cited note 69 supra. Contra, Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y.
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connection witlh" clause, the present state of the law has been
summarized by one leading writer thusly:
[The] impact [of lOb-5] apparently extends to persons, such as issuers, who are
not engaged in any buying or selling of securities but who violate the rule's
prohibition in such manner as to injure someone who is a buyer or seller, and
perhaps to officers and directors simply owing fiduciary duties to their
corporations if a purchase or sale of securities is somehow involved.8 '

Although corporations who neither purchased nor sold have been held
liable, the courts have generally required the additional element that

the defendant's conduct be intentional or economically motivated.
Corporations have been held liable when they participated in a
common scheme to defraud the plaintiffs through their officers and
directors;86 where they made conscious attempts to affect the market
price of their stock-either to depress the price in contemplation of a
merger s7 to to inflate the price during h selling effort;88 and where
officers and directors in control caused the issuance of misleading

statements while trading in the corporation's stock for personal
profit. 89
The Second Circuit has apparently reached the broadest possible
interpretation of the "in connection with" clause. This court granted
injunctive relief but denied recovery of damages when plaintiffs had
purchased shares in a company in reliance on an allegedly misleading
tender offer made by defendant to third parties."0 In A. T. Brod & Co.
v. Perlow, the Second Circuit stated that Rule lOb-5 prohibits "all
fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety
of fraud or present a unique form of deception."'" In that case a
complaint was held to state a cause of action when the plaintiff, a
broker, had bought securities for the defendant, who, it was alleged,
84. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1340, 1365 (1966).
85.
86.

See Note, supra note 80, at 686-87. See also Fleischer, supra note 67, at 1157-58.
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky.

1960); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
87. Puharich v. Borders Electronics Co., [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. RIP,
1, 92,141 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. Siec. L. REP.
91,317 (N.D. II. 1964). But see Heit v. Weitzen, 260 F.
Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (appeal pending); Howard v. Levine, 262 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
88. SEC v. North Am. Research& Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
89. Gann v. Bernzomatic Corp., 262 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see Halleran,
.Srniposiun Insider Trading in Stocks. 21 Bus. LAW 1009, 1025 (1966).

90. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
91. 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967).
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refused to pay unless the value increased. A complaint in the Southern
District of New York was held to state a cause of action when an
escrow agent had wrongfully sold shares of stock pledged as security
for a loan to finance their purchase. The court stated that Rule lOb-5
is "not limited to the portion of the transaction involving an exchange
of consideration .... ."' In Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.,9 3 the
plaintiffs were held to have stated a cause of action even though they
had not purchased or sold, since others in the class to which they
belonged had sold in reliance on the alleged scheme.
Despite these developments, the district court in the Texas Gulf
Sulphur case held that the "in connection with" requirement would
be satisfied only if the purpose of the misleading statement is "to
affect the market price of a company's stock to the advantage of the
company or its insiders." 94 The court found that "[tihere is no
evidence that TGS derived any direct benefit from the issuance of the
press release or that any of the defendants who participated in its
preparation used it to their personal advantage.""5 Therefore the .court
held that there was no violation of section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 by the
pres release, since it was not issued "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security."
After reviewing the history of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the
Second Circuit concluded in Texas Gulf Sulphur that the phrase "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security" was intended to
mean only that the device employed be of a sort that would cause
reasonable investors to rely thereon and, so relying, purchase 'or sell a
corporation's securities. The court did not require that the
corporation or persons responsible for the statement engage in related
trapsactions or act with wrongful motives to benefit the corporation
or themselves at the expense of the investing public9 The court also
reasoned that the public may be injured as much by a misleading
statement caused by negligence as by one published intentionally and
that to require proof of wrongful purpose might permit issuers of
misleading statements "to seek an advantage but to escape iiability if
the advantage fails to materialize to the degree contemplated, or
92. Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
93. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
94. 258 F. Supp. at 293.
95. Id. at 294.
96. This part of the holding has been followed in Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co.,
[Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 4, 92,272 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1968), and Waltman v.
Silverman, 66 Civ. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1968).
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cannot be demonstrated." 97 The court felt that the Commission has
the duty to police management in order to protect investors, and
therefore that it is not unfair to impose a duty on corporate
management to ascertain the truth of statements in releases to
shareholders or to the investing public. Finally, the court held that
Rule lOb-5 is violated "whenever assertions are made . . . in a
manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public . . . if
such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to
mislead irrespective of whether the issuance of the release was
motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes." s As a defense,
the corporate management must demonstrate that it was diligent in
ascertaining that the statements were the whole truth and that such
information was disseminated in good faith. Since the only relief
sought by the Commission against the corporation was an injunction,
the court found it unnecessary to decide whether mere lack of due
diligence, absent a showing of bad faith, would be sufficient to subject
the corporation to civil liability and held only that in an action for
injunctive relief, the injunction could issue if the misleading statement
resulted from a lack of due diligence. The court remanded for a
determination by the trial court as to whether the release was
misleading and if so, whether due diligence was exercised. 9
In a lengthly dissenting opinion, Judge Moore, joined by Chief
Judge Lumbard, disagreed with the majority's broad interpretation of
the "in connection with" clause and stated that such an interpretation
was "unwarranted as a matter of statutory construction and unwise
as a matter of policy."'' 0 The dissenters felt that the statute requires
a much closer connection between the conduct complained of and the
transaction than that which the majority would allow. They also felt
that the majority interpretation might have the effect of deterring the
dissemination of corporate news, despite the strong policy of securities
legislation to encourage disclosure. The dissenting judges emphasized
the findings of the trial court that the release was not misleading and
found that "if the facts and conclusions presented were accurate (as
they were) and if they were not presented in a manner that would
mislead a reasonable intestor (which they were not) then there can be
no violation of l0b-5." '0 The dissent concluded that TGS was not
negligent and that there should be no remand on this issue.
97. 401 F.2d at 861.
98. Id. at 862.
99. The majority indicated that it felt that due diligence had not been exercised in the
preparation of the release. Id. at 864.

100. Id. at 884.
101.

Id. at 880.

19691

NOTES

IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE

A.

TGS

HOLDINGS

Liability of Insiders

The holding in Texas Gulf Sulphur did not really change the
basic definition of "insiders," since the court chose to apply the
language used by the Commission in Cady, Roberts. The significant
part of the holdiig was the clear extension of the definition of insiders
to include employees who were in possession of material, undisclosed
information and the application of Rule lOb-5 to the practice of
"tipping" by insiders. Although the issue was not actually presented,
the court also indicated that "tippees" should also be liable for their
trades. The investment community has expressed deep concern over
the possibility that this language may extend to brokers and analysts
and thereby impose serious restrictions on the conduct of their
business. 112 It is quite probable that the definition of insiders would
apply to brokers who were "tipped" by insiders about undisclosed
corporate developments, and indeed such a situation should be
covered by Rule lOb-5 because of the inherent unfairness of allowing
one broker to use undisclosed information for the benefit of his own
customers at the expense of the uninformed public. There is no
reason, however, why legitimate investment analysis should not be
able to continue uninterrupted. The court expressly permits trading,
even by insiders, which is based on financial or other expert analysis
of "basic facts" which are generally available. Therefore advice which
is based on expert analysis of past performance, industry trends, and
company forecasts would clearly be permissible. The only time that
an analyst would be precluded from trading or advising his clients
would be when some material, undisclosed fact were uncovered in the
course of a general study of the company in question; in this case the
analyst would undoubtedly be under an obligation to make the
information public or to refrain from trading or advising others to
buy on the basis of his discovery. 03
102. Green, SEC' Sees Court Rulings on 'Insider' Trading Changing Brokers Method of
Operations, wall Street Journal, Sept. 3, 1968, at 24, col. L.
103. See In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Administrative
Proceeding File No. 3-1680, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,596 (Aug. 26, 1968). In
a panel interview at the Fall Conference of the Financial Analysts Federation, Mr. Phillip A.

Loomis, General Counsel for the SEC, "warned that an analyst who, in the course of his duties
with a corporation, fortuitously receives inside information, might well be advised to arrange for

the release of the information before using it for his own benefit or that of his clients."
[Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,624 (Oct. 7, 1968). This same warning should apply to
information discovered during an investigation as well.
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Where "tippees" receive their information directly from
corporate officers or directors, there should certainly be no doubt that
the same obligations imposed on insiders should be imposed on them.
The harder cases are those where the tip is accidental or is received
indirectly. In such circumstances, the duty imposed on the "tippee"
should depend on the facts of each case, but a court should consider
such factors as: how the information was obtained, from whom it was
obtained, how reliable the information or the source was, what the
nature of the information was, what degree of financial sophistication
the "tippee" possessed and whether he reasonably believed the
information had already been made public.'"
The Second Circuit has continued to follow the trend of relaxing
the requirements of proof to find liability of insiders who purchased
or sold. The court held in Texas Gulf Sulphur that the plaintiff need
not prove any intent on the part of the defendant and that there will
be liability so long as the insider purchased or sold while in possession
of material, undisclosed information. Since the policy of Rule lOb-5 is
to prevent insiders from taking advantage of their position at the
expense of the public, no proof of intent should be required. The
plaintiff who is injured should only be required to prove that the
insider purchased or sold and that he possessed material information
at the time; themere fact that the insider purchased or sold should be
conclusive evidence that he intended to take advantage of his
information. The court held defendant Huntington liable because his
possession of information was "readily inferable." If proof of intent is
not required, it seems that a plaintiff in a civil action should have to
prove that the insider actually possessed the information. To hold
insiders liable when their knowledge is only inferable might tend to
preclude even legitimate trading by insiders; it should not be the policy
of Rule 10b-5 to discourage all insider trading, but only that trading
which is actually based on undisclosed information.
B.

Definition of Materiality

Although the Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion adheres to the same
basic test of "materiality" which has been followed by other courts,
the court did expand the meaning somewhat by defining a
"reasonable investor" to include the "speculators and chartists of
Wall and Bay Streets.' ' 0 5 The type of information which might affect
104. See Kennedy & Wander, supra note I, at 1065.
105. 401 F.2d at 849.
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the Wall Street speculator's decision to buy or sell might be much less
extraordinary in nature from that which would affect the normal,
small investor. It seems, however, that in defining materiality the
court still contemplates information about the extraordinary situation
which is "reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the
market price Qf the security ... ."01 The court added the
consideration of balancing the indicated probability that the event will
occur and its anticipated magnitude in light of the company's other
activities. What may be material in connection with a small company
may be insignificant in a large one and this test realistically
approaches such a possibility. When the size of TGS17 and the other
activities in which it was engaged at the time K-55-1 was drilled0 8 are
considered, the court may be found to have misapplied its own
standard. The indicated probability that a large mine will be found to
exist on the basis of one encouraging drill hole is very small indeed.' 0'
The court seemed to place its primary emphasis in determining
materiality on the insiders' own purchases. When insiders such as the
defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur buy large amounts of stock on the
basis of certain information and when they previously had owned only
a small number of shares, such purchases must be regarded as highly
pertinent evidence of the materiality of the information to those who
knew about it. Such evidence should never be conclusive on the issue
of materiality; however, since it tends to ignore other developments
within the company which may have had a bearing on the insiders'
purchases. Also, while the insider activity indicates the significance
which they attached to the information, their reliance may be based
on some technical understanding not possessed by the ordinary
investor; too much weight placed on such evidence may unreasonably
penalize the insider. However, since it is unfair to allow insiders to
purchase stock on the basis of information which indicates that there
may be a significant development and to sell with no loss if such
development does not materialize, insider purchases should definitely
be considered on the issue of materiality in order to balance the risks
of all investors.
106. Fleischer, supra note 32, at 1289. Mr. Loomis, in his interview, supra note 103,
interpreted "material" to mean information which would have "substantial" impact on the
securities price.
107. TGS's total assets less current liabilities had a book value of over $169,000,000 as of
December 31, 1963. Its annual sales were in excess of $62,000,000 for 1963. 258 F. Supp. at
268.
108. See note 13 supra.
109. 401 F.2d at 872.
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The Timing of Insider Trading

Although the court set no definite standards as to when insiders
could trade after disclosure had been made, it did hold that they must
wait until the information is effectively disclosed in a manner to
insure availability and that when a prior release has promised
complete disclosure, insiders must await dissemination of the later
announcement. The court indicated that insiders should not be able to
act immediately after disclosure on the basis of their opportunity to
evaluate the information before public disclosure. The clearest result
of Texas Gulf Sulphur is that an insider cannot trade immediately
after a release has been read to the press when he has had the prior
opportunity to evaluate the information.
The court expressed a desire that the SEC use its rulemaking
power to establish some standards for timing of insider trading. The
SEC seems to feel that insiders must wait until the information is
absorbed by the public; the problem, however, is in setting a definite
waiting period which, while meeting that objective, allows some
certainty. Fleischer has suggested that insiders be required to wait
some arbitrary period, such as 24 hours."0 The biggest drawback to
this approach is that some types of information require more time to
be analyzed and understood than others. If the prohibition against
insider trading is to be effective, the delay must be sufficient to allow
the public to be meaningfully informed; on the other hand, however,
the objective is to put insiders and outsiders on an equal footing-not
to put the insiders at a disadvantage. The interests of the investing
public can best be served by encouraging corporate officers and
management to participate in the fortunes of their company by
sharing in its ownership, but unless definite guidelines as to when they
can trade are formulated, the present uncertainties will discourage
such participation."' The competing interests must be balanced against
one another, and perhaps the most equitable result can be achieved by
guidelines which vary the length of the delay according to the nature of
the disclosure. For example, a short waiting period would be required
when an increase in dividends was announced, but a longer period
would be necessary when a development was announced which did not
indicate an immediately apparent benefit to the company.
I10.
I11.

Fleischer, supra note 32, at 1291.
See wall Street Journal, August 16, 1968, at I, col. 6.
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D.

The Stock Options

Now that a shareholder can utilize Rule lOb-5 to enforce
corporate fiduciary duties, a new body of federal corporate law with
Rule lOb-5 as its basis has developed.1 2 Although it seems that the
3
enforcement of corporate duties should be left to state law,'1
derivative recovery probably should be allowed under l0b-5 where the
officer or insider has defrauded the company by causing the issuance
of stock or options to him."' Despite the advisability of allowing a
shareholder to recover where an insider has defrauded his own
company, it does not seem appropriate to allow the SEC to become
the watchdog of corporate fiduciary standards. When an insider
defrauds his corporation, the recovery should belong to the corporation
or its shareholders and should not be enforced by a federal regulatory
agency.
The purpose of stock options is to provide an additional incentive
by allowing management to share in the increases in the stock prices.
As the Second Circuit correctly stated, benefits derived at the expense
of the uninformed public are not the appropriate form of management
incentive: top management which controls the flow of information
both within and without the corporation should not be able to take
advantage of options when in possession of undisclosed information.
Employees who have fully reported to their superiors, however, should
not be so restricted. Once members of top management have been
apprised of material developments by lower echelon employees, it
should be the superior's duty to give the option committee such
information; if the corporate purpose is best served by restricting
dissemination of the information, the employees who have fulfilled
their obligation should-be able to accept their options without fear of
reprisal. Perhaps the most equitable result can be reached in the case
of top management by application of the suggestion of the court in
Texas Gulf Sulphur that where corporate security must be preserved,
insiders should not be required to reject their options but only to
abstain from exercising them until full disclosure has been made.
E. The CorporatePress Release
The Second Circuit remanded the case for a determination of
whether the April 12th press release was misleading, and if so,
112.
113.
114.

See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
See, e.g.. Note, supra note 80, at 681.
(J. Fleiseher, supra note 67, at 1163; Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 277.
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whether it resulted from a lack of due diligence on the part of those
who prepared it. In such a situation, when some new discovery is
developing rapidly, the corporation is placed in a dilemma. If it
speaks too soon and is too optimistic in its reporting, it may be liable
to those who bought in reliance on such report if the development
proves to be unsuccessful. If the company waits too long, in an
attempt to get more definite results, it may find itself liable for failing
to disclose the developments. Although the courts have consistently
refused to interfere with the business judgment of corporate officers,
the decision of when to make corporate announcements must be made
with reference to the investing. public and the duty to keep them
informed. The courts should be hesitant to impose liability on a
corporation for a voluntary statement which is accurate and which is
made in an honest effort to dispel rumors, even though it may appear
to be unduly pessimistic. In judging such a statement, the courts must
not consider the issue with the advantage of hindsight, but must
examine the statement in light of the circumstances which then
existed. When, as in Texas Gulf Sulphur, there is such varied
testimony upon the interpretation given a release by the public, the
errors should be quite clear before the court finds it misleading.
If there was a mistake by the TGS officers, it was probably in
purporting to represent the facts as of the date of the release without
actually having obtained current reports. Considering the rapidity
with which results were becoming known with three drilling rigs in
operation, some attempt should have been made to keep the reported
information current. Perhaps the release should have made a more
specific statement of the basic facts, as suggested by the court, but a
comprehensive report of detailed drilling data might have confused the
public. It does seem, however, that at least a simplified report of the
current findings should have been given.
The most far-reaching holding of the court was that concerning
the "in connection with" clause and the possible liability of the
company. Since the basic policy of the federal securities acts is
disclosure, the courts should not hinder that objective. Voluntary
corporate press releases are probably the most valuable source of
information for investors, but if the requirements are made so strict
that these releases must read like prospectuses, the result may be a
serious curtailment of the flow of corporate information."'
Despite the interest in the availability of corporate information,
115.

See Fleischer, supra note 32, at 1294.
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there must be some assurance that these reports be accurate. The
public may be injured as much by a report that is misleading through
negligence as by one that is intentionally misleading, but the remedial
sanctions for negligent conduct should not be as severe as those for
the intentional conduct. Where intentional deception is used to further
some ulterior corporate purpose, the object of granting civil liability
should be the restoration of damages to the injured public, as well as
the imposition of punitive sanctions to discourage such activity; where
a release is merely negligently misleading, the objective of any
proceedings against the company should not be punitive. Although an
investor may be damaged to some degree by a negligent release, he
may ultimately suffer even greater harm if restrictions on voluntary
releases are so severe as to discourage their use."' When a corporation
is held civilly liable, the loss falls on its shareholders. Placing such a
burden on the corporation for mere negligence in reporting where
there is no ulterior motive seems to be unadvisable.
The public interest in assuring accurate reporting can be served
best by the use of the SEC's injunctive powers. Such a remedy would
be consistent with the SEC's duty of policing corporate reporting, yet
would not unduly penalize the corporation. The burden should be on
the complainant to prove that the questioned release was misleading,
and the defendant should be able to offer proof in its defense that it
had exercised due care. Although the corporation should not be civilly
liable for a negligent statement in the absence of some ulterior motive,
the corporate defendant should have the burden of proving its good
faith, since in some cases an ulterior motive may have existed but also
would be extremely difficult to prove if its objective was not realized.
Such requirements would be consistent with section 18 of the 1934
Act, which imposes liability on a corporation for false or misleading
statements in required reports unless the defendant can prove good
faith and a lack of knowledge of the misleading nature of the
statements.'
It seems quite doubtful that Congress intended higher
116. E.g., Wall Street Journal, August 21, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964) provides: -(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be
made any statement in any application, report, or document, tiled pursuant to this chapter ...
which statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made
false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing
that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have
purchased oi"sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for damages
caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had
no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." The Eastern District Court of
Pennsylvania held that a complaint alleging inaccurate and misleading statements in required
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standards to be placed on voluntary releases through Rule lOb-5 than
it chose to place on mandatory reports through the express language
of section 18.
Where the corporation or the insiders who control its press
releases have engaged in related securities transactions in connection
with a misleading release, the corporation should be subjected to civil
liability regardless of the nature of its conduct in the preparation of
the release. The company should be able to offer proof of its good
faith as a defense; if the proper weight is given to the fact of the
purchase or sale, however, this burden would be extremely difficult to
carry. There is no doubt that a corporation should also be liable
where a misleading statement was published either intentionally or
recklessly, regardless of the motive behind its issuance." 8 The courts
must balance the interests of the investor in the availability of
corporate news against the necessity for absolute accuracy in
voluntary releases, while realizing that too much emphasis on the
latter may result in more harm than benefit to the investor. If
Congress feels that the public interest warrants the imposition of civil
liability for negligence in voluntary reports, then it should provide the
remedy with appropriate safeguards, but an in terrorem approach can
only stifle the flow of information which is essential to investment
judgment.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Texas Gulf Sulphur decision has added little clarity to the
confused areas under Rule lOb-5, but it has strengthened the SEC's
arsenal of weapons against misconduct in securities transactions.
Some degree of certainty in this area of the law is essential if
corporations or their insiders are to be allowed to engage in legitimate
trades in the company's stock without constant fear of possible
liability. The questions which the court left unanswered need to be
resolved-either by the Supreme Court or by Congress. Since TGS
has petitioned for certiorari," 9 the Supreme Court will be given the
opportunity to take its first Rule lOb-5 case and to resolve some of
this confusion which the rapidly expanding developments of the past
reports filed with the SEC stated a cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5, although such an action is
expressly covered by section 18. Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A.. Inc.. 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa.
1964). This holding is in direct disregard of the express congressional statement on the issue.
See Cohen, supra note 84, at 1366.
118. Cy. Note, supra note 80, at 661-67.
119. [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 77,589.
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few years have created. Should the court refuse to hear the case, then
Congress should act to clairfy the extent of the coverage of 10b-5.
Even if the interpretation by the courts is approved, congressional
action should at least add to the sparse language of section 10(b)
some of the safeguards imposed by other civil liability sections of the
federal securities acts. Regardless of the outcome of this case, a final
resolution of the problems must be made with the realization that the
desire to give relief to an injured individual must not be allowed to
obscure the long-range interests of the investing public.
WILLIAM NELSON OZIER

